OnJune14,1863,USMajorGeneralJohnAdamsDixreceivedthefollowingdirectivefromGeneral-in-ChiefHenryHalleck:“AllyouravailableforceshouldbeconcentratedtothreatenRichmond,byseizinganddestroyingtheirrailroadbridgesovertheSouthandNorthAnnaRivers,anddothemallthedamagepossible.“WithGeneralRobertE.LeeandtheArmyofNorthernVirginiamarchingtowardGettysburgandonlyalimitedConfederateforceguardingRichmond,HallecksensedarareopportunityfortheUnioncause.Inresponse,Dix,whohadlivedalifeofconsiderablepublicservicebutpossessedlimitedmilitaryexperience,gatheredhismenandbeganaslowadvance.Duringtheensuingoperation,20,000UStroopswouldthreatentheConfederatecapitalandseektocuttherailroadssupplyingLee’sarmyinPennsylvania.Tosome,Dix’scampaignpresentedatremendouschanceforUSforcestostrikehardatRichmondwhileLeewasoffinPennsylvania.Toothers,itwasanunnecessarylarkthattiedupunitsdeployedmoreeffectivelyinprotectingWashingtonandconfrontingLee’smenonNorthernsoil.Inthisstudy,Newsomeoffersanin-depthlookintothislittle-knownFederaladvanceagainstRichmondduringtheGettysburgCampaign.Thefirstfull-lengthexaminationofDix’sventure,thisvolumenotonlydelvesintothemilitaryoperationsatthetime,butalsoaddressesconcurrentissuesrelatedtodiplomacy,USwarpolicy,andtheinvolvementofenslavedpeopleintheFederaloffensive.Gettysburg’sSouthernFrontalsopointstotheoften-unrecognizedvalueinexaminingeventsoftheUSCivilWarbeyondthelargerfamousbattlesandcampaigns.Atthetime,politicalandmilitaryleadersonbothsidescarefullyweighedDix’seffortsatRichmondandunderstoodthattheoffensivehadthepotentialtogeneratedramaticresults.Infact,thispieceoftheGettysburgCampaignmayrankasoneoftheUnionwareffort’smorecompellinglostopportunitiesintheEast,onethatcouldhavechangedthecourseoftheconflict.
